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Real Property
by T. Daniel Brannan*
Stephen M. LaMastra**
and
William J. Sheppard*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This article surveys case law and legislative developments in the
Georgia law of real property from June 1, 1995 to May 31, 1996. The
authors do not endeavor to chronicle every case decided in the survey
period but, instead, focus on cases and other developments of general
significance. This article discusses several significant cases decided
during the survey period and the single meaningful alteration in Georgia
statutes relating to real property.

II.

TITLE TO LAND

In Gansereit v.Gansereit,' the Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed
the long-standing rule that Georgia courts have no "power or authority
to set aside an instrument transferring title to real property in another
state."2 In that case, Ernest J. Gansereit, a New Jersey resident,
brought an action in the DeKalb County Superior Court against his
brother, Raymond F. Gansereit, to recover eight thousand dollars
allegedly due under a promissory note. Raymond filed a counterclaim
* Partner in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia
State University (A.B., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Vice President and General Counsel, Wolf Camera, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. Formerly
with Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest University (B.A., 1987); Vanderbilt
University (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia.
Emory University (B.A. 1986); Mercer University (J.D., 1992). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. 218 Ga. App. 762, 463 S.E.2d 65 (1995).
2. 1d at 762, 463 S.E.2d at 66.
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seeking to set aside a deed from the brothers' parents to Ernest.
Raymond alleged that Ernest had exercised undue influence over their
parents in convincing them to sell their New Jersey residence for a
fraction of its true market value.' The trial court entered judgment in
favor of Ernest for the amount due under the promissory note and
dismissed Raymond's counterclaim on the basis that the court had no
authority to set aside the sale of the property in New Jersey; Raymond
appealed.4
On appeal, Raymond argued that Georgia courts have authority to set
aside a New Jersey deed based on the doctrine that states must give full
faith and credit to the law of other states.' The court of appeals
rejected that argument as being without merit.6 The court acknowledged that a court generally has authority to adjudicate personalrights
and equities between parties with regard to realty outside the court's
jurisdiction.7 However, the court concluded that actions directly
involving title to real property located in New Jersey must be decided in
that state.8 Because Raymond Gansereit's claim was not based upon in
personam principles, the court found that it had no authority to grant
the relief requested.'
The supreme court held in Wilcox County School District v. Suttonl0
that property may still be used for school purposes even when the school
building located thereon has been demolished."1 The property at issue
in that case was located in Rochelle, Georgia (the "City") and had been
conveyed by the City to the Wilcox County Board of Education in 1950.
The deed evidencing that transfer contained a provision stating that the
"property would revert to the City 'if said property is abandoned for
school purposes.'"12 When the Wilcox County School District announced a plan that included demolition of the school building existing
on the property,"3 a group of residents and taxpayers of Wilcox County
brought suit against the school district and various school officials
seeking an injunction against the demolition and a declaration that the

3. Id.
4. Id. at 763, 463 S.E.2d at 67.
5. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
6. 218 Ga. App. at 762, 463 S.E.2d at 66.
7. Id. (citing Economou v. Economou, 196 Ga. App. 196, 395 S.E.2d 830 (1990); 34
A.L.R.3d 962, 965, § 2).
8. Id. at 763, 463 S.E.2d at 67.
9. Id. at 762-63, 463 S.E.2d at 66.
10. 265 Ga. 720, 461 S.E.2d 868 (1995).
11. Id. at 722, 461 S.E.2d at 870.
12. Id. at 720, 461 S.E.2d at 869.
13. Id.
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title 14to the property on which the building stood had reverted to the
City.

The trial court granted plaintiffs' request for an injunction and set
aside the demolition contract. 5 The trial court also held that a jury
trial was necessary to determine whether the property had been
abandoned "for school purposes" so that title to the property had
reverted to the City. The school district appealed that decision.' 6
In deciding to grant plaintiffs' injunction, the trial court had concluded, based on a deed executed in 1900 by an individual to the City, that
the property was the subject of a charitable trust. The deed stated "that
the City was to hold the property in fee simple 'for the purpose of
erecting and maintain thereon a public school building.'"'7 The
appellate court noted that the deed made no reference to a trust or to
trustees and expressed no intent that a trust be established."8 Based
on those facts, the court of appeals rejected the trial court's finding that
the quoted language was sufficient to create a trust. 9 The court of
"specified the purpose
appeals held that the language of the deed merely
20
for which [the property] was being conveyed."
The appellate court next addressed whether the property had been
abandoned for school purposes. In deciding the meaning of the phrase
"school purposes," the court of appeals relied on the Georgia Supreme
2
Court's decision in Board of Education of Appling County v. Hunter. 1
In Hunter, the phrase "school purposes" was held to mean "'any activity
that is necessary in the proper maintenance and operation of a school
under our present school system.'" 22 The court in Sutton found that the
undisputed evidence before the trial court was that the property
continued to be part of the campus of the consolidated county school
complex.' Under that circumstance, the appellate court held that the
for
evidence demanded the conclusion that the property was still in use 24
school purposes and had not reverted to the City as a matter of law.

14.

Id.

15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19.

Id. at 721, 461 S.E.2d at 870.

20. Id.
21. 190 Ga. 767, 10 S.E.2d 749 (1940).
22. 265 Ga. at 722, 461 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting Hunter, 190 Ga. at 768, 10 S.E.2d at
750).
23.

Id.

24. Id.
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In Evans v. Lipscomb,25 Melo Evans filed an action seeking equitable
re-partitioning of property located in Cherokee County.26 Glen Lipscomb and Herbert Childers purchased the land as tenants in common on
October 8, 1949. Between 1949 and 1986, Lipscomb and Childers sold
approximately fifty acres of the land. In 1986, Lipscomb and Childers
executed an agreement (the "1986 Agreement") dividing the remaining
land along an "old logging road" running through the property.
However, Lipscomb and Childers failed to designate in their agreement
which party retained which portion of the divided property. On July 21,
1987, and again on March 22, 1991, Lipscomb and Childers executed
quitclaim deeds to clarify that issue. Both sets of quitclaim deeds
purported to convey "50 acres, more or less."27
After execution of the second set of quitclaim deeds, Lipscomb
commissioned a survey of his tract. The survey showed that Lipscomb
had actually received only twenty-one acres upon the 1986 division of
the property with Childers. Childers also commissioned a survey of his
tract in 1992. The survey showed that Childers received just over fiftyone acres as a result of the 1986 agreement. On April 22, 1992, Childers
conveyed the western parcel of his property to Evans."8
Thereafter, Lipscomb and his son requested that Childers and Evans
consent to a more equitable redivision of the property. Both Childers
and Evans refused. Following Mr. Lipscomb's death, the executor of
Lipscomb's estate filed an action against Evans seeking equitable
reformation of the 1986 Agreement and subsequent quitclaim deeds to
reflect the parties' intention to divide the remainder of the property
evenly. Evans filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the
action was barred by the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitation. The trial court denied the motion, and Evans appealed.2 9
On appeal, the executor urged that he was seeking reformation of the
corrective quitclaim deed executed in 1991.80 On that basis, he
asserted that the action was timely filed within the seven-year limitation
period applicable to actions to reform written instruments transferring

25. 266 Ga. 767, 470 S.E.2d 641 (1996).
26. Id. at 767-68, 470 S.E.2d at 642.
27. Id. at 768, 470 S.E.2d at 642.
28. Id. By the time both surveys were conducted, Lipscomb and Childers had already
sold a portion of the property they received through the 1986 Agreement and subsequent
quitclaim deeds. Mr. Lipscomb had conveyed two acres of his land to a third party,

retaining 19.09 acres as shown in his survey. Mr. Childers had conveyed five acres to a
third party, retaining 46.25 acres. Id. at 768-69, 470 S.E.2d at 643.
29. Id. at 769, 470 S.E.2d at 643.

30. Id.
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title to realty.3 1 The executor argued that, because neither the 1986
agreement nor the 1987 quitclaim deed accurately described the land the
parties intended Lipscomb to receive, Lipscomb had neither legal nor
colorable title to his portion of the property only as a result of that 1991
deed. 2 The supreme court rejected that argument, finding that
Lipscomb's title was perfected when he entered into possession of the
intended portion of the property. Because possession occurred in July
1986, the cause of action to reform the written instrument accrued at
that time. 3
The executor also argued that even if the cause of action to reform the
1986 Agreement accrued in 1986, it was tolled for some period of time
due to mutual mistake or fraud. The appellate court also rejected that
argument.'
"As a general rule, the statute of limitation does not
commence to run against an equitable action for reformation of a written
instrument based on mutual mistake or fraud until the mistake or fraud
has been, or by the exercise of a reasonable diligence should have been,
discovered." 5 In this case, the record contains no explanation for
Lipscomb's failure to conduct a survey before or after the execution of
the 1986 Agreement. The court also concluded that "a visual inspection
of the property should have made [Lipscomb] aware of the disparity in
the two parcels." 6 Based on those facts, the court concluded that
Lipscomb had, as a matter of law, failed to act with the due diligence
required to toll the running of the statute of limitation. Because
Lipscomb did not file the lawsuit until December 1994, the court
concluded that
the action was barred by the expiration of the statute of
7
limitation.

Another case decided during the survey period involves an issue
relevant to developers and contractors of subdivisions in Georgia." In
Frazier v. Deen,39 residents of Lake Park "C" Addition to Section One
(the "Subdivision") brought an action against the developers and the
builder of certain houses in the Subdivision seeking to avoid changes in

31. Id. (citing Whittle v. Nottingham, 164 Ga. 155, 138 S.E. 62 (1927)).

32. Id. The 1986 Agreement failed to specify which portion of the Cagel Property
Lipscomb was to receive, and the 1987 quitclaim deed recited that the parties received
property on the opposite side of the old logging road from that actually intended. Id. at
768, 470 S.E.2d at 643.
33. Id. at 769-70, 470 S.E.2d at 643.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 770, 470 S.E.2d at 643.
Id., 470 S.E.2d at 643-44 (citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 197 (1987)).
Id., 470 S.E.2d at 644.
Id. at 770-71, 470 S.E.2d at 644.
Frazier v. Deen, 221 Ga. App. 153, 470 S.E.2d 914 (1996).
221 Ga. App. 153, 470 S.E.2d 914 (1996).
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the restrictive covenants for the Subdivision. The original restrictive
covenants required "that garages and carports be entered from the side
or rear of the house,"' but specifically provided that the developers
could amend the terms. On May 26, 1994, the developers sold their last
eight lots in the Subdivision to the builder defendant. Later that year,
the builder requested an amendment to the protective covenants to allow
front-entrance garages on three of the lots it had purchased so that
larger houses could be constructed on them. The developers agreed and
amended the covenants applicable to the Subdivision. Plaintiffs filed an
action seeking to set aside that amendment.4 '
Plaintiffs argued that the developers lost whatever right they had to
alter or amend the protective covenants when the developers sold the
last property owned by them in the Subdivision. Plaintiffs relied on the
holding in Armstrong v. Roberts42 that adopted for Georgia a rule
applicable in New York and Illinois providing that "a developer of a
subdivision who reserved the authority to waive restrictions in covenants
running with the land no longer possesses that authority after divesting
himself of his interest in the subdivision."' Plaintiffs argued that,
because the developers in Frazierno longer owned any property, the rule
announced in Armstrong applied to them."
The developers and the builder filed a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted that motion, and plaintiffs appealed. 4s
The court of appeals followed the reasoning of the supreme court in
Armstrong. It agreed that, by selling their last lot in the subdivision,
the developers waived their right to amend the restrictive covenants.'
However, that conclusion did not end the court's analysis. Because
plaintiffs were seeking injunctive relief, the court assessed the harm that
would be caused from granting the injunction and balanced that harm
against the harm from allowing development under the amended

40. Id. at 153, 470 S.E.2d at 915.
41. Id.
42. 254 Ga. 15, 325 S.E.2d 769 (1985).
43. 221 Ga. App. at 154, 470 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting Armstrong v. Roberts, 254 Ga. at
16, 325 S.E.2d at 770).
44. Id. There was some discussion regarding whether the developers still retained an
interest in the Subdivision. The developers argued that they retained an interest based

on the fact that Lake Park "C" was only one part of a larger development in which the
developers still owned lots. The court rejected that argument based on the fact that the
restrictive covenants at issue only applied to Lake Park "C," not to the entire development.

Id.
45. Id. at 153, 470 S.E.2d at 915.
46.

Id. at 154, 470 S.E.2d at 916.
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protective covenants.4 7 Based on the evidence presented to the trial
court, there was no indication that plaintiffs would be harmed by
permitting construction under the amended protective covenants. The
evidence indicated that the waiver was granted so that "larger, more
expensive homes could be built on the lots affected" and that the
plaintiffs' property values would actually increase.' Based on those
facts, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment against
plaintiffs on their request for injunctive relief as a matter of law.49
Although the builder prevailed in Frazier,this case should provide a
warning to other builders. In order to avoid the type of litigation
involved in Frazier, builders considering the purchase of the few
remaining lots in a planned community should carefully investigate
whether those lots are appropriate for development under the applicable
restrictive covenants. If the lots are not appropriate and the developer
retains the right to waive or amend those restrictions, the builder should
obtain that waiver or amendment prior to making its purchase.
Two other cases decided during the survey period also arose out of
disputes relating to planned communities. In the first, the supreme
court affirmed the rights of a homeowners' association to enforce a lien
for nonpayment of association assessments.5 ° In the second, the
supreme court held that a homeowners' association was not entitled to
ownership of common recreational areas constructed within the
subdivision.5
The facts in Timberstone Homeowner's Ass'n v. Summerlin"2 are
relatively straightforward. J.E. Summerlin purchased a lot in the
Timberstone Subdivision in 1976. A "Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Timberstone" was recorded
in the Fulton County land records that applied to all lots in the
Timberstone Subdivision. The Declaration expressly provided for the
47. Id. The court in Armstrong stated that an injunction to enforce protective
covenants "should be refused where its grant would operate oppressively on the defendant's
rights." 254 Ga. at 16,325 S.E.2d at 770-71 (quoting MARTA v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491,495,
254 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1979)).
48. 221 Ga. App. at 154, 470 S.E.2d at 916. The court also noted that the developers'
ownership in property in the remaining portions of the overall development (but outside
the Subdivision) provided an economic disincentive to any arbitrary waiver of restraints
by the developers. Id. at n.1.
49. Id. at 155, 470 S.E.2d at 916. However, the court specifically reserved the issue of
whether plaintiffs would be entitled to recover money damages to the extent those might

be proven. Id. at n.2.
50.
51.
S.E.2d
52.

Timberstone Homeowners Ass'n v. Summerlin, 266 Ga. 322,467 S.E.2d 330 (1996).
Hampton Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. Marett Properties, Ltd., 265 Ga. 655, 460
790 (1995).
266 Ga. 322, 467 S.E.2d 330 (1996).
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payment of assessments by homeowners for the maintenance of common
property and facilities and for the collection of unpaid assessments by
imposition of a continuing lien. After his purchase, Mr. Summerlin
conveyed his interest in the lot to his wife, Evelyn, who thereafter
reconveyed the lot to Mr. Summerlin."
Beginning in 1989, the homeowners' association filed liens against the
lot based on the Summerlins' failure to pay the assessments; the liens
eventually totaled $2,141. Mr. Summerlin filed an action to have the
liens removed. He alleged that membership in the association was
voluntary and that he never used the recreational facilities at issue.
Both Mr. Sunmerlin and the Homeowners' Association filed motions for
summary judgment. The trial court granted Mr. Summerlin's motion,
finding that the covenant requiring payment of assessments "did not
pertain to land use [and] was not binding on Summerlin without his
affirmative acceptance. 6 4 The association appealed, and the supreme
court reversed.55
The court stated the established rule that a "purchaser is charged with
legal notice of the [recorded] covenant, even if it is not stated in his
deed."56 Further, relying on Lowry v. Norris Lake Shores Development
Corp. 57 the court stated that a covenant requiring payment of a charge
for common recreational facilities is binding on a purchaser with
notice.5" Under those circumstances, the court concluded that the trial
court erred in denying the association's motion for summary judgment. 9
Hampton Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. Marett Properties, Ltd.'
concerned a dispute regarding ownership of the swim and tennis facility
constructed in the Hampton Ridge Subdivision.61 The plat recorded
prior to construction of the subdivision designated one tract as a
recreational area. 2 Subsequently a "Declaration of Covenants and
Restrictions" and a "Consent to be Bound" were filed in the land
records." The Declaration provided that the developer was to retain

53.
54.

Id. at 322, 467 S.E.2d at 331.
Id. at 322-23, 467 S.E.2d at 331.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 323,467 S.E.2d at 331-32 (citing King v. Baker, 214 Ga. App. 292,447 S.E.2d

129 (1994)).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

231 Ga. 549, 203 S.E.2d 171 (1974).
266 Ga. at 323-24, 467 S.E.2d at 332.
Id. at 324, 467 S.E.2d at 332.
265 Ga. 655,'460 S.E.2d 790 (1995).
Id. at 655, 460 S.E.2d at 790.
Id.
Id.
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"fee title to and all rights in all property owned by the developer and
designated as common property or for public use.' 4
During a dispute that arose concerning assessments to pay for the
recreational area, Marett Properties, Ltd. ("MPL"), the successor to the
original developer, failed to pay property taxes on the recreational area.
As a result of that failure, the recreational area was sold by the county
at a tax sale to Jean Marett, the wife of the owner of MPL's corporate
general partner. 5
The Homeowners Association filed an action against MPL and Marett
seeking a declaration of title to the recreation area and the imposition
of a constructive trust on amounts paid as assessments by the homeowners for the recreational area. After presentation of evidence, the trial
court granted a directed verdict to MPL and Marett. The Homeowners
Association appealed from the entry of the judgment on the directed
verdict."
On appeal, the Homeowners Association based its claim on title to the
disputed property on the designation of that tract as recreational area
in the original subdivision plat. The general rule in Georgia is that
purchasers of lots in a subdivision acquire an easement in all areas set
aside for their use on the recorded plat.67 That easement constitutes
an irrevocable property right that cannot be abrogated without express
abandonment or conduct amounting to an abandonment of that right.6"
The supreme court concluded that the purchasers of lots in the Hampton
Ridge Subdivision had expressly abandoned their right to an easement
in the swim and tennis facility.69 That finding was based on the
language of the Declaration stating that the developer retained "fee title
to and all rights in" the recreational area.7"
The court also rejected the Homeowners Association's arguments
relating to the imposition of a constructive trust on assessments paid to
MPL. "A constructive trust 'is a remedial device created by a court of
Essentially, the
equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment.'"'
as
assessments for
paid
funds
to
recover
sought
Homeowners Association
property
recreational
bills
on
the
utility
the year in which taxes and
the
appellate
and
concluded,
the
trial
court
were not paid. However,
64. Id. at 656, 460 S.E.2d at 791.
65. Id. at 655, 460 S.E.2d at 790.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 656, 460 S.E.2d at 791 (citing Doughtie v. Dennison, 240 Ga. 299, 240 S.E.2d
89 (1977)).
68. Id. (citing Westbrook v. Comer, 197 Ga. 433, 29 S.E.2d 574 (1944)).
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. Id. (quoting Lee v. Lee, 260 Ga. 356, 392 S.E.2d 870 (1990)).
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court agreed, that there was no evidence of any misappropriation of
funds by MPL.72 At most, the evidence established that a dispute
existed regarding the "priorities according to which the money was
disbursed."73 That showing was insufficient as a matter of law to
establish a breach of fiduciary duty or to impose a constructive trust on
those funds.74
III.

LANDLORD/TENANT AND DISPOSSESSORY

Four cases decided during the survey period involved significant legal
issues relating to leases and the relationships between landlords and
tenants. In Cardin v. Outdoor East,75 the court of appeals discussed
the language sufficient to describe property that is the subject of a lease
and whether a lease longer than one year is enforceable absent a
signature by the parties to be bound.7" The lease in Cardin was for a
period of eighteen years. Under the lease, Outdoor East was to lease
property belonging to the Cardins for the purpose of erecting and
maintaining an outdoor advertising billboard. The lease described the
property only as "I-75." 77 The lease was signed by the Cardins but was
not signed by Outdoor East.7" Outdoor East filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the lease was unenforceable based
on an inadequate description of the leased property and the absence of
a writing signed by Outdoor East. The trial court granted that motion,
and the Cardins appealed.79
The appellate court concluded that there were facts provable under the
Cardins complaint which could entitle them to relief. In Georgia, leases
are enforceable, despite an insufficient description of the property, when
Similarly,
the lessee has actually taken possession of the property,
even though the lease is for a term longer than one year, it could be
taken outside the statute of frauds through part performance by the
lessee.8" Based on the existence of those potential claims by the
Cardins, the appellate court concluded that judgment could not be
entered on the pleadings and reversed the trial court.82

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 656-57, 460 S.E.2d at 791-92.
Id. at 657, 460 S.E.2d at 791.
Id., 460 S.E.2d at 791-92.
220 Ga. App. 664, 468 S.E.2d 31 (1996).
Id. at 664-65, 468 S.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 665, 468 S.E.2d at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Barto v. Hicks, 124 Ga. App. 472, 184 S.E.2d 188 (1971)).
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31 (1982)).
Id., 468 S.E.2d at 31-32.
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Powell v. Estate of Austin 3 also involved a question relating to the
statute of frauds. In Powell, the Estate of William B. Austin, Maurice
F. Steinberg, and Birnet Johnson ("Lessors") executed an agreement
with Charles Edward Bell, Benny Camel Smith, and Bell & Smith
Enterprises, Inc. ("Lessees") for the lease of property located in Augusta,
Georgia suitable for operating a restaurant. The original term of the
lease was five years, but Lessees had the right to renew and extend the
lease for two additional five-year periods beginning on July 1, 1990. In
order to exercise the renewal option, the lease required that Lessees
provide Lessors written notice of their exercise of the first option prior
to the expiration of the existing lease term.'
During the initial term of the lease, Lessees shifted ownership of the
restaurant and Bell & Smith Enterprises, Inc. ("Smith Company") among
themselves. In January 1998, Smith became the sole shareholder in
Smith Company while Bell became the sole owner of the restaurant
located on the leased property. Bell later formed a new corporation, Bell
& Son Enterprises, Inc. ("Bell Company") to operate the restaurant.
Lessors were unaware of the change in ownership of Smith Company or
of the restaurant.8 5 In March 1990, after Smith was no longer involved
in the operation of the restaurant, Bell provided written notice to
Lessors of Smith Company's intent to renew the lease. Bell provided
that notice in his purported capacity as president of Smith Company."
On the basis of Bell's notice, Lessors renewed the lease for a five-year
period through June 30, 1996. 87
In August 1990, F. Carol Powell, III purchased all the stock of Bell
Company and began operating the restaurant. Powell informed Lessors
that he had assumed the lease. In return, Lessors informed Powell that
he would "be considered the tenant and thus would be individually liable
Powell was aware of the five-year renewal term
on the lease."
purportedly exercised by Bell and made payments of rent to Lessors

83. 218 Ga. App. 446, 462 S.E.2d 378 (1995).
84. Id. at 446-47, 462 S.E.2d at 379.
85. Id. at 447, 462 S.E.2d at 379.
86. Id. The Court did not make clear in its opinion whether Bell actually retained the
position as president of Smith Company despite the change in ownership and his creation
of Bell Company. However, the use of the word "purport" in its opinion and the Court's
later finding that there was no evidence of his authority to act on behalf of Smith Company
indicate that he did not retain that position. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 447-48, 462 S.E.2d at 379.
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pursuant to the terms of the lease. Powell also received proceeds from
a condemnation of a portion of the parking lot for the restaurant.8 9
Powell operated the restaurant until the summer of 1992 when he
abandoned the leased premises. When that occurred, Lessors filed an
action for a distress warrant against Powell. In that action, Lessors
sought to recover the costs of repairs to the leased property.' A jury
trial was held, and a verdict was entered against Powell. At the
conclusion of that trial, Powell made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Powell argued that Lessors had
failed to provide any evidence that a landlord-tenant relationship existed
between them and Powell. He also argued that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence concerning damage to the leased premises. The trial
court denied Powell's motion, and Powell appealed."1
In deciding whether there was any evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Powell
and Lessors, the appellate court first considered whether the lease had
properly been renewed. Because the renewal term was for longer than
one year, the court concluded that both the notice to extend the lease
and the authority of the agent exercising that option had to be in
writing.92 Because the record contained no evidence that Bell had any
authority to act on behalf of Smith and Smith Company at the time he
purportedly exercised the option to renew, the lease was not been
properly renewed. Therefore, the court concluded that Powell "was not
an assignee or subtenant pursuant to a valid express contract." 5
That conclusion, however, did not terminate the court's inquiry. The
court next considered whether Powell and Lessors had sufficiently
performed under the lease, as extended, so that it had been taken
outside the statute of frauds.
A parol contract sought to be enforced as within some exception to the
Statute of Frauds ... must be certain and definite in all essential

89. The condemnation actually took place during the original lease term (i.e., before
June 30, 1990) and before Powell "assumed" the lease from Lessees. In fact, Lessees had
originally intervened in the condemnation proceeding and asserted a right to a portion of
the condemnation proceeds based on their leasehold interest in the leased property. It is
unclear from the court's opinion, but it may be presumed that Powell received an

assignment of the right to those proceeds along with his purchase of the stock in Smith
Company. Id. at 447-48, 462 S.E.2d at 379-80.

90. 'Id. at 448, 462 S.E.2d at 380.
91. Id. at 447, 462 S.E.2d at 379.

92. Id. at 448,462 S.E.2d at 380 (citing Shivers v. Barton &Ludwig, Inc., 164 Ga. App.
490, 296 S.E.2d 749 (1982)). See also O.C.G.A. §§ 13-5-31 and 10-6-2 (1996) (codifying the
Equal Dignities Rule).
93. 218 Ga. App. at 448, 462 S.E.2d at 380.
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particulars, and if part performance is relied upon to make it enforceable, the part performance must be part performance of an essential
element of the contract sought to be proved, and of a character which
would render
it a fraud on the plaintiff if the defendant refused to
94
comply.
The court found that the evidence before the jury sufficiently identified
the "party to be held liable [under the lease], the monthly rental, and
the duration of the lease."95 Further, the court concluded that Powell's
acceptance of the condemnation proceeds constituted part performance
of the lease." In light of those facts, the court concluded that the jury
could properly have found the existence of an implied lease contract
between Powell and Lessors sufficient to support an action for distress
97
warrant.

The court also considered Powell's assertion that the trial court
improperly admitted evidence relating to physical damages to the
leasehold at the time Powell vacated it."5 Powell cited D. Jack Davis
Corp. v. Karp," for the proposition that a distress warrant may only be
used to recover possession of the property and rent due under the lease,
not to recover other damages." °
The court concluded that Powell
misinterpreted D. Jack Davis Corp. That conclusion was based on the
language of section 44-7-77(a) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
("O.C.G.A."), which states that "[If, on the trial of the case, the
judgment is against the tenant, the judgment shall be entered against
the tenant for all rent due and for any other claim relating to the
dispute."01 The court stated that the inclusion of the phrase "and for
any other claim relating to the dispute" clearly indicated that the
Georgia legislature "intended that a distress proceeding may be used to
recover damages in addition to rent if they are somehow related to the
lease."'

94. Id. at 448-49, 462 S.E.2d at 380 (quoting Norris v. Downtown LaGrange Dev.
Auth., 151 Ga. App. 343, 259 S.E.2d 729 (1979)).
95. Id. at 449, 462 S.E.2d at 380.

96. Id. The court also noted that the "Statute of Frauds provides no defense to a
promising party when the other party has acted on the promise to his detriment." Id. By

sharing the proceeds of the condemnation with Powell based on his representation that the
lease had been extended, the Lessors had acted to their detriment. Therefore, Powell was
estopped to assert the statute of frauds as a defense. Id. (citing Scott v. Lumpkin, 153 Ga.
App. 17, 264 S.E.2d 514 (1980)).
97. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 381.
98. Id.
99. 175 Ga. App. 482, 333 S.E.2d 685 (1985).
100. 218 Ga. App. at 450, 462 S.E.2d at 381.
101. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-77(a) (1991).
102. 218 Ga. App. at 451, 462 S.E.2d at 381-82.
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The holding in Powell is important because it clarifies the scope of
claims that may be brought in distress warrant actions. Under that
court's interpretation of O.C.G.A. section 44-7-77, lessors may seek to
recover all damages relating to or arising out of a breach of a lease
pursuant to the expedited procedure allowed in distress warrant
cases. 10 3 That result, however, presents a potential problem for
lessees. In the future, lessors (who may have more financial resources
to support litigation) may use the expedited distress warrant procedures
to "fast track" significant litigation relating to damages arising out of
leases. The difference between lessors' and lessees' ability to respond
quickly in litigation may result in verdicts more favorable to lessors than
might otherwise be achieved.
04
The court in Pakwood Industries, Inc. v. John Galt Associates,'
clarified the conditions under which it is reasonable for a lessor to
withhold its consent to an assignment of a lease to a new lessee. In that
case, Pakwood Industries, Inc. entered into a lease for space in Montreal
Court AA. The lease provided that Pakwood "could not assign the lease
or sublease the premises without prior written consent of the landlord,
which consent could not be unreasonably withheld."'0 5
Pakwood
operated a custom woodworking business on the leased premises. John
Galt Associates subsequently purchased Montreal Court AA.
After Galt purchased the property, Pakwood began negotiating a sale
of its assets to System Implementation Services, Inc. ("SIS") and its
owner Michael Greenberg. SIS was a manufacturing consulting
company, Greenberg was its only employee. Greenberg had formed SIS
in 1990.07 Greenberg had experience as a business consultant, but he
had no significant experience in the business conducted by Pakwood. °
Pursuant to the proposed purchase and sale transaction, SIS would
purchase all of Pakwood's assets but would assume none of Pakwood's
liabilities. In exchange, SIS was to pay Pakwood $200,000 in cash at
closing plus $337,000 in promissory notes and $100,000 in an "earn out"
to be paid over five years. As security for repayment of the promissory
notes, SIS would execute a security agreement attaching all the assets
it had obtained from Pakwood under the sale. Additionally, Greenberg

103. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-77(a).
104. 219 Ga. App. 527, 466 S.E.2d 226 (1995).

105. Id. at 528, 466 S.E.2d at 227.
106. Id.
107. Id., 466 S.E.2d at 227-28.
108. Id. at 529, 466 S.E.2d at 229. The court noted that Greenberg had little
experience "in furniture or cabinet making or any associated industry." Id.
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was to execute a personal guaranty for $437,000. Pakwood was also to
arrange assignment of its lease with Galt."°
Gait agreed that it would consent to the assignment of the lease
between Pakwood and SIS if Greenberg and Pakwood's owner would
individually guarantee SIS's obligations under the lease. Pakwood's
principal and Greenberg refused to execute such guarantees, and Gait
withheld its consent to the assignment. As a result of Gait's refusal to
consent, the proposed transaction between Pakwood and SIS did not
close.11o
Pakwood brought suit against Galt for damages based on the failed
transaction and alleged that Galt had unreasonably withheld its consent
to an assignment of the lease. The trial court granted Galt's motion for
summary judgment, finding that there was no evidence sufficient to
create a genuine issue with regard to Pakwood's claim."' On Pakwood's appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court
and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Galt."2
The appellate court stated that "a lease clause providing that a lessor
cannot unreasonably withhold consent to assign the lease is a covenant
upon the landlord.""1 ' In that context, the term "reasonable" refers to
"considerations of fairness and commercial reasonableness." 14
In
other words, consent cannot be withheld for "arbitrary or capricious
reasons, or merely for personal preferences. " "' In assessing whether
a lessor has arbitrarily withheld its consent, the courts should primarily
consider whether the landlord had some reasonable apprehension that
the proposed tenant would be financially unable to perform under the
lease."'
The undisputed facts in the record before the trial court demonstrated
the following: (1) After the sale to SIS, Pakwood would have no assets
and its viability as an ongoing entity was questionable; (2) SIS was a
relatively new business with no rental history; (3) All of SIS's assets
acquired from Pakwood would be pledged to Pakwood as security for
debt; (4) SIS's owner and sole employee had no significant experience in

109. Id. at 528, 466 S.E.2d at 227-28.
110. Id., 466 S.E.2d at 228. Gait actually proposed an alternative arrangement under
which it would consent to the assignment. That suggestion was also rejected. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 528-29, 466 S.E.2d at 228.
113. Id. at 529, 466 S.E.2d at 228 (citing Sterns Gallery v. Corporate Property
Investors, 176 Ga. App. 586, 337 S.E.2d 29 (1985)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing 54 A.L.R.3d 679; Jack Frost Sales, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank,
433 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. 1982)).
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the business to be operated on the leased premises; (5) Pakwood had
experienced financial difficulties and had failed to pay rent for the leased
premises. 117 Based on those facts, the court found "the requirement for
personal guarantees [from Greenberg and Pakwood's principal] was
clearly and palpably commercially reasonable and established the
commercial reasonableness of Galt's decision as matter of law."1 8 The
holding in Pakwood provides lessors a clear roadmap of the reasons that
may support their decision to withhold consent to an assignment of a
lease.
The court in Owens v. Barclays/American Mortgage Corp."' considered whether a landlord may insulate itself from liability to a tenant for
wrongful dispossession by employing an independent contractor to
conduct that dispossession. Owens involved the dispossession of Gordon
Owens from a condominium (the "Condo") which Barclays/American
Mortgage Corp. ("Barclays") acquired through foreclosure.
After
foreclosing on the Condo, Barclays hired Capital Securing Company to
inspect the property and advise Barclays whether it was occupied.
Barclays also instructed Capital to inform Barclays immediately if the
Condo was occupied. 20 Pursuant to Barclay's instructions, Capital
sent its employees to the property. Those employees found the
condominium "open with no furniture inside."'2 ' They were also
informed by Owens' neighbor that Owens had moved. Based on that
information, Barclays requested that Capital "'secure the property for
final conveyance' in accordance with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development's instructions for the State of Georgia." 122 In
securing the Condo, Capital's agents "disposed of dirty clothes which
were strewn about the floor and removed and stored 'everything which
appeared to be salvageable.'"'2
Owens returned later that same day and discovered that the locks
were changed. Owens contacted Barclays and Capital and informed
them that he had been wrongfully dispossessed, that he was still living
in the Condo, and that he had paid the current month's rent. Barclays
returned the items Capital had removed, but Owens claimed that some
items had been lost or damaged. Owens filed an action for wrongful
dispossession against Barclays.'2

117,
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 527-30, 466 S.E.2d at 227-29.
Id. at 529-30, 466 S.E.2d at 229.
218 Ga. App. 160, 460 S.E.2d 835 (1995).
Id. at 161, 460 S.E.2d at 837.
Id.
Id. at 160-61, 480 S.E.2d at 836-37.
Id.
Id.
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Barclays filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that if
Owens was wrongfully dispossessed, Capital was the liable party
because Capital was an independent contractor instead of Barclays'
and granted its motion
employee. The trial court agreed with Barclays
125
appealed.
Owens
judgment.
summary
for
The appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding that Capital
was an independent contractor. Barclays "had no control over the
method or manner in which Capital inspected, cleaned and secured the
property in this case, and [Barclays] did not direct or participate in
[those] activities." 126 Therefore, Barclays generally would not be
responsible under a theory of respondeat superior for the torts committed by Capital. 127 However, the court found that this case fit within
an exception to the general rule with regard to liability of an employer
for the acts of its independent contractor. 128
Under O.C.G.A. section 44-7-50,129 an owner seeking to take posses-

sion of leased premises must follow certain procedures. The owner must
demand possession of the property, and if the tenant refuses to deliver
possession, the owner must file an affidavit for possession." If the

125. Id. at 160, 460 S.E.2d at 836.
126. Id. at 161-82, 460 S.E.2d at 837. The court's finding in this matter was based
upon Owens' failure to produce any evidence showing that Barclays "controlled the time,
manner and method of executing the work in which his personal property was removed
from the condominium." Id. at 162, 460 S.E.2d at 837.
127. Id. at 161, 460 S.E.2d at 832 (citing McDaniel v. Peterborough Cable Vision, 206
Ga. App. 437, 428 S.E.2d 424 (1992)).
128. Id.
129. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
130. 218 Ga. App. at 162,460 S.E.2d at 837-38 (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50). Section 447-50 states:
(a) In all cases where a tenant holds possession of lands or tenements over and
beyond the term for which they were rented or leased to the tenant or fails to pay
the rent when it becomes due and in all cases where lands or tenements are held
and occupied by any tenant at will or sufferance, whether under contract of rent
or not, when the owner of the lands or tenements desires possession of the lands
or tenements, the owner may, individually or by an agent, attorney in fact, or
attorney at law demand, the possession of the property so rented, leased, held or
occupied. If the tenant refuses or fails to deliver possession when so demanded,
the owner or the agent, attorney in fact, or attorney at law of the owner may go
before the judge of the superior court, the judge of the state court, or the clerk or
deputy clerk of either court, or the judge, clerk or deputy clerk of any other court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter, or a magistrate in the district where the
land lies and make an affidavit under oath to the facts. The affidavit may
likewise be made before a notary public subject to the same requirements for the
judicial approval specified in Code Section 18-4-61, relating to garnishment
affidavits.
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50(a).
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owner forcibly dispossess a tenant in violation of the requirements of
O.C.G.A. section 44-7-50, the owner is subject to an action for trespass. 1 ' The court concluded that although the owners of property are
allowed to conduct dispossessions through their agents or attorneys,
"nothing in the statute... would allow an owner to avoid liability for a
wrongful eviction by delegating [its] duties to an independent contractor."13 2 Therefore, material questions of fact remained to be decided

at trial concerning Barclays' liability to Owens that precluded entry of
summary judgment, and the appellate court reversed. 3 '
The holding in Barclays contains an implicit warning to owners of
leased property. Hiring independent contractors to take possession of
property formerly leased will no longer insulate such owners from
liability for wrongful dispossession. In order to avoid that liability,
property owners may be required to become more involved with and
exert greater control over the methods used by those independent
contractors. The risk that property owners run in doing so is that their
relationships to those contractors may be transformed to that of
employer and employee, resulting in the potential for greater liability to
the property owner. The alternative to exerting greater control over
independent contractors is for owners to ensure that those contractors
will indemnify and hold the property owner harmless for their wrongful
acts and that the contractors have the financial ability to stand behind
those indemnification obligations.
IV.

SALES CONTRACTS AND BROKERS

In Hanlon v. Thornton," Ellsworth Hanlon purchased a tract of
land in Clark and Oglethorpe Counties fom Luther and Evelyn Smith
for $150,000. Hanlon learned about the property through Steve
Brannen, a real estate agent with Purvis & Associates. Hanlon intended
to operate a mobile home park on the property. 35
In February 1990, before purchasing the property, Hanlon came to
Georgia from his home in California, met with Brannen, and viewed
several pieces of property. The next day, Hanlon executed a contract to
purchase the property from the Smiths and then returned to Califor-

131. 218 Ga. App. at 162, 460 S.E.2d at 838.
132. Id.
133. Id. Owens had also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
whether he had abandoned the Condo or was forcibly dispossessed. The trial court denied
that motion for partial summary judgment. On appeal, that decision was affirmed. Id.

134. 218 Ga. App. 500, 462 S.E.2d 154 (1995).
135. Id. at 500, 462 S.E.2d at 155.
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nia. 36 The next month Hanlon and his wife returned to Georgia for
the closing. On the morning of the closing, Hanlon inspected the
property and the mobile homes located thereon and made a list of
defective items. Hanlon also had the quality of the well water on the
property tested and spoke to Jack Griffith of the Oglethorpe County
Commission about Hanlon's plans to put a mobile home park on the site.
At the closing, "Hanlon was warned that Georgia is a 'buyer beware
state.'' 117 Hanlon left the closing and returned an hour later after
having a conversation with a friend. Hanlon demanded and received a
price concession from the Smiths for defects he identified in the mobile
homes. 3 '
After the closing, Hanlon and his wife moved into one of the mobile
homes on the property. At that point, things began to go wrong. First,
Hanlon had to replace a furnace, a stove, and a refrigerator in one of the
mobile homes. He also had to recoat the roof of another mobile
home. 3'
The well on the property "kept drying up and produced
discolored water which smelled of sulfur.""4 Hanlon spent ten thousand dollars for a new well on the property. Finally, Hanlon also
learned that the property was adjacent to a landfill and that it was
smaller than represented in a flyer he received before the closing.
Based on all the problems he discovered after closing, Hanlon filed an
action against the Smiths, Brannen, Purvis & Associates, R.M. Thornton
(the listing agent), and Smith-Boley-Brown (Thornton's company).'"
In that action, Hanlon alleged fraud and sought rescission of the sales
contract, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney fees.'
Hanlon claimed that Brannen told him that there were no landfills in
the area and that the property had been appraised at $150,000.'4
Defendants claimed that Hanlon had failed to exercise due diligence to
justify his reliance on any misrepresentations regarding the landfill and

136. Id.
137. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 156.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 500-01, 462 S.E.2d at 156.
140. Id. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 156.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 500, 462 S.E.2d at 155.
143. Id. Hanlon claimed that the Smith's were bound by Brannen's representations
because "he believed that Brannen was representing him as well as the sellers of the
property, because this dual agency was allowed under California law and Brannen told him
that Georgia law was the same as California law." Id. Because of the Court's holding
concerning the reasonableness of Hanlon's reliance, it did not reach the issue of Brannen's
agency. Id.
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the value of the property. The trial court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and Hanlon appealed.'"
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision finding that
Hanlon failed as a matter of law to prove that he justifiably relied on
any misrepresentations by defendants.14 The court based its decision
on the fact that Hanlon made no independent efforts to discover the
14
existence of landfills in the area or the true value of the property.
The means of obtaining that knowledge were equally available to Hanlon
and defendants. The court noted that Hanlon "could have had an
inspector check the appliances [in the trailers and]... could have asked
for an independent appraisal of the value of the property."147 Further,
the court noted that Hanlon had not "even attempted to make an
independent inquiry as to whether or not there was a landfill in the
area."'" Given those facts, the court concluded that Hanlon had failed
as a matter
of law to establish an element essential to his claims for
149
fraud.

Hanlon relied on the holdings in Dorsey v. Green50 and GeorgiaCarolinaBrick & Tile Co. v. Brown'5 ' to support his argument that his
limited investigation, coupled with Brannen's alleged misrepresentations
concerning the absence of a landfill, raised a material question of fact
whether his reliance was reasonable. The appellate court distinguished
both cases.'52 First, Dorsey involved the actions of an executor of a
will who had fiduciary obligations to the plaintiff." Because of that
fiduciary relationship, the court in Dorsey concluded that the plaintiff
was "not bound to exhaust all means at his command to ascertain the
truth before relying on the representations [of the fiduciary]."" 4 In
this case, there was no fiduciary relationship between defendants and
Hanlon; therefore, his reliance on their representations was not
reasonable.'
Similarly, the court rejected Hanlon's argument that Brannen's failure
to identify the landfill in response to Hanlon's direct question supported

144,
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150,
151.
152.
153.
154.
166.

Id. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 156.
Id. at 502, 462 S.E.2d at 157.
Id., 462 S.E.2d at 156.
Id., 462 S.E.2d at 157.
Id.
Id. at 502-03, 462 S.E.2d at 157.
202 Ga. 655, 44 SE.2d 877 (1947).
153 Ga. App. 747, 266 S.E.2d 531 (1980).
218 Ga. App. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 156.
202 Ga. at 659, 44 S.E.2d at 380.
Id.
218 Ga. App. at 602, 462 8.E.2d at 166.
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a claim for fraud." Unlike the situation in Georgia-CarolinaBrick,
the alleged defect in this case could have been discovered through an
exercise of reasonable diligence and required no specialized training to
discover.157 Absent any investigation by Hanlon there is no basis for
finding defendants liable for fraud.'5 8
The Georgia Court of Appeals in Eva Pendley Realty, Inc. v. Bagley 159 provided some instruction about what constitutes a "written
listing agreement" within the meaning of the Georgia Commercial Real
Estate Broker Lien Act." 6 In that case, Troy Preston Bagley and
Evelyn Bagley brought an action against Evan Pendley Realty, Inc.,
seeking to set aside a
David Bagley, and Carl Kandell (the "Brokers")
161
lien the Brokers filed pursuant to the Act.
In order for a real estate broker to have a lien under the Act, two
principle conditions must be satisfied: (1) there must be "a listing
agreement... as evidenced by a writing signed by the owner;" and (2)
the broker must locate a buyer "ready, willing, and able to enter and
who actually enters into a purchase or lease" of the property. 62 The
issue in this case was whether a listing agreement existed. The
document on which the Brokers relied was an advertising brochure
The brochure was entitled "property inforsigned by the Bagleys.'
mation" and included the following language: "'I want $15,000 net to me
per [acre] base 83 approx.'"'6
The Bagleys filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the
Brokers were unable to establish the existence of a written, signed
a

156, Id. at 503, 462 S.E.2d at 157.
157. In Carolina Brick, the defect complained of was not obvious to the untrained
observer. However, the person making the false representation had specialized knowledge
concerning the defective product. 153 Ga. App, at 748, 266 S.E.2d at 535,
158. 218 Ga.App. at 503, 462 S.E.2d at 157. Although the court in Hanlon was not
required to reach the issue, Hanlon's actions after the closing may have precluded him
from obtaining rescission in any event. In order to rescind a contract for fraud, a plaintiff
must promptly notify the defendant of its election to rescind upon discovery of the fraud.
See Manning v. Wills, 193 Ga. 82, 17 S.E.2d 261 (1941) (party seeking to rescind a contract
based on fraud must, upon discovering fraud, act at once and announce his purpose to
rescind and adhere thereto). In this case, Hanlon made repairs to the property, including
replacing appliances in one of the mobile homes and installing a new well on the property
after he should have discovered the misrepresentations of which he complained. Those
actions could be viewed as affirming the contract and preventing rescission at a later date.

218 Ga. App. at 503, 462 S.E.2d at 157,
159. 219 Ga. App. 208, 464 S.E.2d 850 (1995).
160. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-600 to -613 (1982 & Supp. 1996).
161, 219 Ga. App. at 208, 464 S.E.2d at 851.
162. O.CG.A. § 44-14-602(a)(1) & (2) (Supp. 1996).
1683. 219 Ga. App. at 203, 464 S.E.2d at 851.
164. Id.
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listing agreement between them and the Brokers. The trial court
granted that motion, and set aside the Brokers' lien on the property.
The Brokers appealed.16
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment."
The court held that the advertising brochure did "not
provide [the Brokers] with the right to procure a buyer and receive a
commission for the sale of the Bagleys' realty."16 7 Therefore, the court
agreed that a condition precedent to the Broker's right to a lien had not
occurred. Brokers of commercial real estate in Georgia should take note
of the court's decision and should attempt to ensure that an agreement
providing them the right to procure a buyer and to receive a commission
is signed with regard to every transaction in which they are involved.
In Barnes v. Whatley,"' William Whatley, d/b/a Whatley Realty filed
an action against James Barnes seeking to recover a real estate broker's
commission arising out of a failed transaction. The transaction involved
approximately sixty-six acres of land owned by The Peoples Bank and
offered for sale through an oral, nonexclusive listing agreement with
Whatley. Whatley advertised the property for sale and showed the
property to Barnes on one occasion. Barnes then wrote a check for ten
percent of the listing price and gave it to Whatley as a deposit. Whatley
completed the check by denoting the payee as "Whatley Realty Trust
Account" and noting on the check "[elarnest money on 66.21 acres." 9
In exchange for the check, Whatley gave Barnes a receipt that contained
the notation "Binder on 66.21 acres pending title clearance and 30 days
to close." 7 ' Whatley did not deposit Barnes' check.
The next day Whatley drafted a real estate sales agreement and
mailed it to the Bank. That contract expressly obligated the Bank to
pay Whatley a real estate commission "'when the sale is consummated.'"'171 The instrument also stated, "[tihis instrument shall be regarded as an offer by the Purchaser or Seller, who first signs, as to the other
and is open for acceptance by the other until 4:00 p.m. on the 7th day of
July, 1993.172 The Bank signed the agreement and returned it to
Whatley, but Barnes refused to close the transaction. After the Bank

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id. at 204, 464 S.E.2d at 851.
Id. at 203, 464 S.E.2d at 851.
221 Ga. App. 110, 470 S.E.2d 498 (1996).
Id. at 110, 470 S.E.2d at 499.
Id.
Id. at 111, 470 S.E.2d at 499.
Id., 470 S.E.2d at 499-500.
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sold the property to another purchaser, Whatley sued Barnes to recover
the commission that would have been due. 7
The trial court concluded that there was a complete contract between
the Bank and Barnes and that, because Whatley procured a ready,
willing, and able purchaser, Barnes was obligated to pay the real estate
the contract. 74
commission to Whatley upon Barnes' withdrawal from
7
reversed.
Barnes appealed, and the appellate court
First, the court of appeals found no binding and enforceable contract
between the Bank and Barnes. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 13-5-30(4),
all contracts for the sale of land "must be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged therewith or some person lawfully authorized by
him."176 Because Barnes never signed the agreement, he was not
obligated to abide by its terms. Further, the court concluded that the
agreement executed by the Bank omitted several essential terms,
including the purchase price, the terms of the sale, and a legal description of the property. 177 Those omissions also rendered the contract
unenforceable. 171
Despite the absence of an enforceable contract between the Bank and
Barnes, Whatley argued that he was entitled to a commission under the
terms of O.C.G.A. section 10-6-32, which provides that "[t]he broker's
commissions are earned when, during the agency, he finds a purchaser
who is ready, willing, and able to buy and who actually offers to buy on
the terms stipulated by the owner." 179 The court rejected Whatley's
argument, finding that O.C.G.A. section 10-6-32 "contemplates a
mutually binding and enforceable sales contract."" s°
Therefore,
although the closing of a sale is not a condition precedent to a broker's
right to a commission under O.C.G.A. section 10-6-32, the broker must
establish the existence of a binding contract of sale.'
Under the
circumstances of this case, the court concluded that Barnes had no
obligation to pay a broker's commission to Whatley."2

173.
174.
175.
176.
177,
178.
179.
180.
181.
182,

Id. at 110-11, 470 S.E.2d at 499-500.
Id. at 111, 470 S.E.2d at 500.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(4) (1982 & Supp. 1996).
221 Ga. App. at 111-12, 470 S.E.2d at 500.
Id. (citing Smith v. Wilkinson, 208 Ga. 489, 67 S.E.2d 698 (1951)).
O.C.G.A. § 10-6-32 (1994).
221 Ga. App. at 112, 470 S.E.2d at 500.
Id.
Id., 470 S.E.2d at 501.
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FORECLOSURES

Two cases were decided during the survey period that provide
important instruction on the method of advertising foreclosure and of
providing notice of a foreclosure sale to the debtor."
In Southeast
Timberlands, Inc. v. Security National Bank,' 4 Southeast Timberlands
executed a promissory note for $400,000 payable to Security National
Bank. Timberlands pledged certain property to secure the repayment of
the $400,000 note and "'all other indebtedness, past or future, owed' by
Timberlands to the [Blank."" 5 The original note was replaced by a
renewal note in the face amount of $362,000. The original note was
marked "paid by renewal," but no evidence was introduced to establish
that the renewal note "extinguished any obligations under the original
note.' 8 6
When Timberlands defaulted under the renewal note, the Bank
advertised the secured property for foreclosure and conducted a
foreclosure sale. That advertisement referenced a debt of $400,000. The
advertisement also "referenced 'all renewal or renewals, extension or
extensions of said indebtedness, either in whole or in part' and
announced that the [B]ank had declared the entire 'balance,' not note,
due and collectible.""8 7 After conducting the foreclosure sale, the Bank
reported the sale for confirmation. The trial court confirmed the sale
over Timberlands' objection, and Timberlands appealed."M
The court performed a two-part inquiry into whether the foreclosure
sale conducted by the Bank was improper. As noted by the court, there
are certain minimum legal requirements concerning the contents of
foreclosure advertisements, and a failure to meet those minimum
requirements will render the foreclosure sale defective as a matter of
law.1" 9 In order for a foreclosure advertisement to be valid, it must
contain a full and complete description of the property to be sold,
including the street address of the property, and the names of the
creditor, the debtor, and any person who may be in possession of the
property."49 An advertisement is not required to include the amount
183. Southeast Timberlands, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 220 Ga. App. 359,469 S.E.2d
454 (1996); Zeller v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 220 Ga. App 843, 471 S.E.2d 1
(1996).
184. 220 Ga. App. 359, 469 S.E.2d 454 (1996).
185. Id. at 359, 469 S.E.2d at 454.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 359-60, 469 S.E.2d at 456.
188. Id. at 359, 469 S.E.2d at 456.
189. Id. at 360, 469 S.E.2d at 454 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-13-140(a) (1993 & Supp. 1996)).
190. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-140(a) (1993 & Supp. 1996).
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of the debt. Therefore, the court concluded that "a misstatement or
overstatement of the debt does not render [the] advertisement legally
defective."'9 1
However, as the court noted, a foreclosure advertisement that is not
defective as a matter of law may still prevent confirmation if defects in
the advertisement "chilled" the bidding, thereby causing an inadequate
selling price."9 The court stated that "errors [in the advertisement]
that would not confuse the bidding intentions of any potential bidder of
sufficient mental capacity to enter a binding contract for the sale of real
property do not show a chilling of the sale so that a fair market value
bid was not obtained." 93 Timberlands argued that by advertising a
higher debt amount, the Bank made it appear that a higher bid would
be needed to purchase the property. The court rejected that argument
because a bidder at a foreclosure sale is not required'to bid the amount
of the indebtedness.194

In the third section of its opinion, the court noted that the trial court
"made no explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the
legality of the advertisement, any possible effect these alleged defects
had on bidding, or the fair market value of the property."' 95 The trial
court is required to make those findings by O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161,
and the absence of explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law
impeded the appellate court's review. However, the appellate court
stated that the obligation to provide an appropriately detailed order for
review fell to Timberlands." Timberlands failed to request such an
order either before or after the trial court's ruling. Therefore, the
appellate court had no basis for finding that the trial court had failed to
make the appropriate factual findings and legal conclusions and had no
choice but to affirm.'9 7 Based on the holding in Timberlands any
debtor opposing confirmation of a foreclosure sale would be well-advised
to ensure that a detailed order is entered. Only by doing so may a
debtor preserve a meaningful appeal.

191. 220 Ga. App. at 360, 469 S.E.2d at 456.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Williams v. South Central Farm Credit, ACA, 215 Ga. App. 740, 742,
452 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1994)).
194. Id. at 360, 469 S.E.2d at 457. In fact, a secured creditor is not required to bid in
the amount of the debt at a foreclosure sale. Rather the confirmation procedure merely
seeks to ensure that the purchase price at foreclosure reflects the "true market value of the
property." O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(b).
195. 220 Ga. App. at 361, 469 S.E.2d at 457.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 361-62, 469 S.E.2d at 458.
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In Zeller v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, ' Paulette Zeller
sued Home Federal Savings & Loan Association of Atlanta alleging that
Home Federal had wrongfully foreclosed on her property.'" Zeller had
executed a promissory note in favor of Home Federal together with a
security deed for property she owned in Mableton, Georgia ("Mableton
Property"). In August 1992, Zeller moved to Rome, Georgia ("Rome
address"). Zeller failed to make the required monthly payments due to
Home Federal on several occasions. Pursuant to Home Federal's policy,
it sent notices of default to the Mableton Property and, after August
1992, to the Rome address as well. The notices sent to the Mableton
Property were sent via certified mail while the notices sent to the Rome
Zeller orally informed Home
Address were sent regular mail.2°
Federal that she had moved, and a Home Federal representative made
a written notation of Zeller's new address in the Bank's file. However,
Zeller never provided written authorization to Home Federal to use her
Rome address for delivery of notices of default.
In September 1993, Home Federal sent Zeller a foreclosure and
acceleration letter by certified mail.20 ' It was undisputed that Home
Federal "sent written notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. [section] 44-14-162.2
by certified mail to the [Mableton Property]." 20 2 However, notice was
not sent to the Rome address. Thereafter, Home Federal foreclosed on
the Mableton Property.
After the foreclosure sale, Zeller filed her action for wrongful
foreclosure contending that Home Federal failed to give her notice of the
sale as required by law. Zeller argued that Home Federal's actual
knowledge of her Rome address triggered a duty for Home Federal to
send notice of the foreclosure to her at her Rome address. Home Federal
filed a motion for summary judgment based on its compliance with the
requirements of O.C.G.A. section 44-14-162.2. The trial court rejected
Zeller's argument and granted Home Federal's motion for summary
judgment.0 3 Zeller appealed.20 4
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision because
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-162(a) requires that notice of foreclosure be in

198. 220 Ga. App. 843, 471 S.E.2d 1 (1996).
199. Id. at 843, 471 S.E.2d at 1.
200. Id. at 844, 471 S.E.2d at 1-2.
201. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 2. That September 1993 letter followed earlier default letters
delivered in May, July, August, October, November, and December 1992 and in January,
February, March, May, June, and July 1993. In fact, the court referred to Home Federal's
notices to Zeller as a "blizzard of paperwork." Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 844-45, 471 S.E.2d at 2.
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writing and "sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the property address or to such other address as the debtor
may designate by written notice to the secured creditor." 5 The court
concluded that Zeller's oral communication with Home Federal, the
notation made by Home Federal's employee in Zeller's file, and the
receipt of payment from checks listing the Rome address did not
constitute written notice within the meaning of section 44-14-162.2.2os
The procedure Home Federal followed for giving notice of default and
notice of a foreclosure and acceleration is one commonly used in the
Georgia lending community. The holding in Zeller confirms that this
procedure satisfies the secured lender's obligations with regard to notices
of foreclosure. It also provides a model of the procedure necessary to
comply with the foreclosure statute for other lenders who may not have
a policy similar to that of Home Federal.
In John Alden Life Insurance Co. v. Gwinnett Plantation,Ltd.,20 7 the
court of appeals clarified what a foreclosing creditor must do in order to
"report" the foreclosure sale.208 In that case, John Alden Life Insurance Company foreclosed on real property owned by Gwinnett Plantation, Ltd. ("Debtor") on May 2, 1995. On May 11, Alden filed a petition
for confirmation of its foreclosure sale in the Gwinnett County Superior
Court. The summons attached to the petition was stamped in the clerk
of court's office assigned to Judge Weingarten. 2 9 However, Alden did
not deliver a copy of the petition to Judge Weingarten.
The Debtor filed a motion to dismiss the petition for confirmation; the
trial court granted that motion, finding that Alden had failed to comply
with O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161, which requires the foreclosing party to
report the foreclosure sale to the superior court judge. 21' Alden
appealed."

205. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a) (1996).
206. 220 Ga. App. at 845, 471 S.E.2d at 1.

207. 220 Ga. App. 846, 470 S.E.2d 482 (1996).
208. Id. at 847, 470 S.E.2d at 482.
209. Id. at 846, 470 S.E.2d at 483.
210. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (1996). That Code section states as follows:
When any real estate is sold on foreclosure, without legal process, and under
powers contained in security deeds, mortgages, or other lien contracts and at the
sale the real estate does not bring the amount of the debts secured by the deed,
mortgage, or contract, no action may be taken to obtain a deficiency judgment
unless the person instituting the foreclosure proceedings shall, within 30 days
after the sale, report the sale to the judge of the superior court of the county in
which the land is located for confirmation and approval and shall obtain an order
of confirmation and approval thereon.
211. 220 Ga. App. at 846, 470 S.E.2d at 483.
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On appeal, Alden argued "that the assignment by the clerk to Judge
Weingarten was tantamount 'to reporting the sale to the judge as
required by [section 44-14-161]. ' "212 The appellate court rejected that
argument and strictly construed the "reporting" requirement because
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161 is in derogation of the common law. The
court concluded that the judge, not the clerk of court, must be made
aware of the sale."' The court specifically distinguished the steps
taken by Alden to report the foreclosure sale from those steps taken by
the secured creditor in Cornelia Bank v. Brown.214 In Cornelia, the
petition for confirmation was delivered to the judge's chambers, but the
judge was not present. His secretary, "acting upon authority previously
given to her by the judge, affixed the judge's signature stamp to the
order scheduling a hearing on the petition."21 ' That method of reporting was determined to be in technical compliance with the requirements
of O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161 because the petition was presented "in the
manner authorized by the judge."1 6 Therefore, the appellate court
affrmed the trial court's judgment dismissing the confirmation petition
based on Alden's failure to comply with the statutory requirements for
confirmation. 7
Baby Days, Inc. v. Bank of Adairsville21 1 presented a factual situation of first impression in Georgia. Holmes executed a promissory note
(the "Holmes' Note") dated August 9, 1990, to the Bank of Adairsville.
That note was given to evidence an obligation to repay an amount
loaned by the Bank to Holmes to purchase a commercial building (the
"Adairsville Property"). Holmes executed a security agreement and
security deed for the Adairsville Property with the Bank as grantee.
That security agreement contained a "dragnet" clause that stated as
follows:
SECURED OBLIGATIONS: Until terminated in writing, the security
agreement secures the payment of this note and all other debts

borrower may now have or in the future owe to lender, (including, but
not limited to, all other notes, insurance premiums, overdrafts, letters
of credit, guaranties and all extensions, renewals,2 19refinancings and
modifications of this note and of other such debts).

212. Id.
213. Id.

214. Id. (distinguishing Cornelia Bank v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 68, 303 S.E.2d 171
(1983)).
215. Id. (quoting Brown, 166 Ga. App. at 68, 303 S.E.2d at 172).

216. Id. (quoting Brown, 166 Ga. App. at 69, 303 S.E.2d at 173).
217. Id. at 847, 470 S.E.2d at 483.
218. 218 Ga. App. 752, 463 S.E.2d 171 (1995).
219. Id. at 752, 463 S.E.2d at 172.
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Baby Days, Inc., a company owned by Holmes, executed a promissory
note (the "Baby Days Note") for $195,514.85 to obtain working capital
from the Bank. The Baby Days Note was secured by the company's
accounts receivable, equipment, inventory, and a certificate of deposit.
The Baby Days Note also contained a provision stating that it "'may be
secured by prior or subsequent security documents notwithstanding that
such security is not indicated hereon.'" 2" Finally, Holmes and his wife
executed guaranties of the Baby Days Note. '
In February 1993, Baby Days defaulted on its repayment obligations
to the Bank under the Baby Days Note. Holmes defaulted on his
personal note on May 1, 1993. The Bank accelerated the Baby Days
Note on June 24, 1993. Afterward, the Bank exercised a series of setoffs
which still left a balance owing under the Baby Days Note. Under the
Holmes' security deed, the Bank exercised its power of sale on September 7, 1993, and bid on the222Adairsville Property for $135,000. The Bank
did not confirm that sale.

After foreclosing on the Adairsville Property, the Bank commenced a
lawsuit against Baby Days, Holmes, and his wife to collect the balance
due on the Baby Days Note. 2" In his defense, Holmes argued that the
Bank's failure to confirm the foreclosure sale of the Adairsville Property
barred any action against him for a deficiency judgment. Ms. Holmes
also argued that the Bank's failure to confirm the foreclosure sale
resulted in the release of her obligations as a co-surety under O.C.G.A.
section

10-7-20.224

The parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. The trial court granted the Bank's motion and denied the
motions filed by Holmes and his wife. Holmes and his wife appealed.225
On appeal, Holmes argued that he had only one debt to the Bank even
though his debt arose out of several contracts. He based his argument
on the existence of the dragnet clauses. He further argued that a single
piece of property secured that consolidated obligation to the Bank.226
The Bank, on the other hand, argued that there were two separate debts

220. Id.

221. Id.
222. Id. at 753, 463 S.E.2d at 172-73.
223. The Bank also filed an action against Edison Industries, Inc., another guarantor
on the Baby Days Note. However, Edison Industries was in the same position as Ms.
Holmes and asserted the same arguments and defenses in response to the Bank's lawsuit.
Id., 463 S.E.2d at 173. For simplicity, this discussion will refer only to Ms. Holmes.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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and that it had foreclosed on the Adairsville Property pursuant to the
default under the Holmes personal loan, not pursuant to Holmes'
guaranty of the Baby Days Note.227
Agreeing with the Bank, the appellate court noted the following: the
two loans were not to the same debtor; the debtors executed the loan
instruments at different times; each loan was for a separate and distinct
purpose; and the corporate debt was secured by property not serving as
collateral for Holmes' personal debt.228 Based on those factors, the
court concluded that the Bank's action against Holmes was "'not to
recover a deficiency judgment on the debt for which foreclosure was had,
but to recover on a separate, subsequent and different note.'"2" The
court reached that decision although "the dragnet clause pertaining to
the Holmes' personal loan documents conceivably could be construed as
indirectly subjecting the foreclosed real property (that served as direct
collateral to Holmes' personal loan) to constitute additional collateral,
through the medium of the Holmes' guaranty documents, for the
corporate loan."2 0'
Based on the decision about Holmes' claims, the appellate court
rejected Ms. Holmes' contention that she had been released as a. cosurety.231 Additionally, the court of appeals noted that Ms. Holmes
had waived her rights under O.C.G.A. section 10-7-20 in the express
language of her guarantee document.232 In her guaranty, she authorized the Bank to make any settlements or compromises "as it may deem
proper with respect to any of the indebtedness, liabilities and obligations
covered by this guaranty, including the taking or releasing of security
and surrendering of documents."' 3
Although the Bank of Adairsville prevailed in that case, the holding
from Baby Days should be a warning to secured lenders. Where a single
debtor or group of related debtors has executed a series of promissory
notes, some of which are secured by realty, the lender must carefully
consider whether confirmation of a foreclosure sale is a necessary precondition to pursuit of an action on other notes. The four factors cited
by the court in Baby Days must be the focus of any such consideration.

227. Id. at 754, 463 S.E.2d at 173.

228. Id.
229. Id. (quoting Vaughn & Co. v. Saul, 143 Ga. App. 74, 77, 237 S.E.2d 622, 626

(1977)).
230. Id. at 754-55, 463 S.E.2d at 174.

231. Id. at 755, 463 S.E.2d at 174.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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DOMAIN AND CONDEMNATION

Department of Transportation v. Sharpe14 is the second appearance
of this case before the court of appeals. The first appeal followed entry
of a jury verdict and involved questions relating to the trial court's
The jury's verdict was reversed, and the
instructions to the jury.23
was remanded for a new trial. This appeal follows the second
case 36
2
trial.
The case arises out of the condemnation of property owned by R.G.
and Dabney Sharpe, individually and as administrators of the estate of
C.W. Sharpe. The Sharpes were the owners of 19.289 acres of wooded
land that contained significant limestone deposits. However, the
Sharpes had not mined the limestone. The Department of Transportation ("DOT") condemned that property. During the trial, to establish the
value of the property, the DOT presented testimony from its appraiser
that the property was worth $23,750.237 The Sharpes, on the other
hand, presented testimony that their interest in the property was worth
between $616,000 and $666,000. According to the Sharpes' appraiser,
that value was broken down into two components-one for the surface
acreage ($16,000) and the second for the present value of the mineral
deposits upon extraction ($600,000 to $650,000). At the close of the
evidence, the DOT moved to strike portions of the testimony from the
Sharpes' expert. 23" The trial court denied that motion, and the jury
entered a verdict in favor of the Sharpes for $850,000. The DOT
appealed.239
The court of appeals agreed with the DOT that the testimony from the
Sharpes' appraiser concerning the value of the condemned property was
improperly admitted. 240 The court stated that land containing deposits
of valuable minerals "may be of greater market value than land without
such deposits, but the land and the deposits constitute one subject
matter and there cannot be a recovery for the land as such, and also for

234. 219 Ga. App. 466, 465 S.E.2d 695 (1995). The first appearance of this case was
discussed in last year's real property survey. See T. Daniel Brannan, et al., Real Property,
47 MERCER L. REV. 269, 300-03 (1995). The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari on
March 11, 1996, and reversed the court of appeals decision. Sharp v. DOT, No. S96G0546,
1996 WL S66824 (Ga. 1996).
235. 213 Ga. App. 549, 445 S.E.2d 343 (1994).
236. 219 Ga. App. at 466, 465 S.E.2d at 695-96.
237. Id. at 466, 465 S.E.2d at 696.
238. Id. at 467, 465 S.E.2d at 697.
239. Id. at 466, 465 S.E.2d at 696.
240. Id. at 468, 465 S.E.2d at 697.
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the deposits."24 The court concluded that "testimony could be offered
as to the enhanced value of the land based upon the presence of the
limestone deposits; however condemnees cannot value their land and the
mineral deposits separately."242 In reaching that decision, the court
relied upon the decisions reached in Williams v. Mayor of Carrollton,'4
and Southern Railroad v. Miller.2 " Based on the presentation of
improper evidence, the appellate court again reversed the trial court's
judgment.24 5
The court in Sharpe has made a definitive statement of what expert
testimony may not properly say about the value of land containing
valuable mineral deposits. However, the court left unanswered the
question of what testimony is proper. In order to present testimony that
concerns the value of land containing unextracted mineral deposits and
that comports with the court's holding in Sharpe, condemnees may be
required to produce testimony from persons possessing knowledge of the
amount a mining company would pay for the property. It seems clear,
however, that when no mining activities are being conducted, the
condemnees of such property would be precluded from introducing
testimony concerning the value of the property based solely on the
stream of income that could be generated from a mining lease.
The court in Fulton County v. Funk24 again considered an appeal
involving application of the so-called "undivided fee rule." Fulton
County and the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA)
condemned property owned by Dr. Sidney Funk and leased to his
professional corporation.247 At the conclusion of the evidence during
the trial relating to the amount of compensation Dr. Funk and his
professional corporation were to receive, the trial court charged the jury
"that the amount of just and adequate compensation should 'equal to the
whole-the value of the whole property, just and adequate compensation
The condemnees appealed from the jury
for the whole property. '
verdict; the court of appeals reversed, citing White v. Fulton County.249

241. Id.

242. Id. at 469, 465 S.E.2d at 697.
243. 195 Ga. App. 590, 394 S.E.2d 389 (1990).
244. 94 Ga. App. 701, 96 S.E.2d 297 (1956).
245. 219 Ga. App. at 469, 465 S.E.2d at 698. See supra note 234.
246. 266 Ga. 64, 463 S.E.2d 883 (1995).
247. Id. at 64, 463 S.E.2d at 884.
248. Id.
249. 264 Ga. 393, 444 S.E.2d 734 (1994). The decision reached in White was discussed
in this survey last year. See T. Daniel Brannan, et al., Real Property,46 MERCER L. REV.
269, 298-300 (1995).
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The supreme court granted certiorari to consider the holding of the court
of appeals and reinstated the verdict entered in the trial court 5 0
The issue considered in Funk is whether, absent a showing of
uniqueness in the property, the compensation to be paid for a property
is limited to the value of the fee interest in the property. That issue was
created by the holding in Bowers v. Fulton County,251 in which the
Georgia Supreme Court held "that a condemnee could seek business
losses as a separate element of just and adequate compensation, in
addition to the value of the real property interests taken or damaged."252 The court in Funk stated that where no business losses are
recovered, "the fair market value of the real property taken does, in fact,
constitute just and adequate compensation... [and] the condemnor need
only pay the value of the land that was taken, which is then to be
2
divided among the claimants based upon their respective interests." 5
Because a leasehold generally only has value to the lessee if he is paying
below-market rent, any value that the lessee's interest in the property
has necessarily reduces the value of the fee owner's interest in that same
property.254 Therefore, the court concluded as follows:

[T]he fair market value of the property that was taken is generally the
maximum amount that the condemnees can recover for their lost
interests in the real property. This is true because, when the value of
the real property that was taken is being determined, any "value" in
the leasehold generally results in a corresponding loss in the "value"
of the fee. The only exception is when the condemnees successfully
assert that the property that was taken has unique value. 56

The court also stated that its decision in Funk did not alter the
conclusion reached in White because "the issue of uniqueness and
business losses had been injected into that case."2
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sears and Thompson,
Justice Hunstein took exception to the majority decision in Funk.2 57
The dissent pointed out "real world" considerations that the majority
failed to consider. First, Justice Hunstein stated the following:

250. 266 Ga. at 67, 463 S.E.2d at 886.
251. 221 Ga. 731, 146 S.E.2d 884 (1966).
252. 266 Ga. at 64, 146 S.E.2d at 884.
253. Id. at 65, 463 S.E.2d at 885.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 66, 463 S.E.2d at 885 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
256. Id.
257. Fulton County v. Funk, 266 Ga. 64, 67-69, 463 S.E.2d 886 (1995) (Hunstein, J.,
dissenting).
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Only in an ideal world could the undivided fee rule operate constitutionally, an ideal world where the appraisal of property interests could
be so precisely calculated that condemnees' loss would indeed equal
precisely condemnor's gain. But the real world produces opinions,
instead of absolutes, and as long as valuation testimony conflicts and
a jury is entitled to believe or disregard all or any part of any
witnesses' testimony, the reality is -thatthere will be jury verdicts in
which the total monetary amount awarded to justly and adequately
compensate the individual interests in a condemned property may
exceed the monetary amount attributed by witnesses at trial as
representing the value of the unencumbered fee as a whole.2
Furthermore, Justice Hunstein wrote that
[as a] practical matter it should be noted that because the jury
generally decides whether condemned property is unique, the distinction the majority attempts to draw between unique and non-unique
property will fail in application and its opinion will result in the giving
of the undivided fee rule charge in all condemnation cases."
The effect of the majority's holding in Funk on the valuation of unique
properties in condemnation cases is uncertain. However, practitioners
should watch this area carefully in the coming years.
In Department of Transportation v. 2.953 Acres of Land,2" the
Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether evidence of consequential
damages and cost to cure was properly admitted in a case involving a
partial taking of commercial property. In that case, the DOT condemned
2.953 acres ("Condemned Tract") of a 32.2-acre tract ("Property") on
which the condemnee operated a wholesale grocery distributorship.26 '
The condemnee's business operation included storage facilities with a
refrigerated loading dock, office space, a truck maintenance facility, its
own water supply, and a retention pond. The business also had access
to rail service and a state-maintained highway. At the time of the
taking, the Condemned Tract was undeveloped, but the condemnee
presented testimony at trial that the Condemned Tract was the
designated area for its planned expansion. 262

258. Id. at 68, 463 S.E.2d at 887.
259. Id. at 69, 463 S.E.2d at 887.

260. 219 Ga. App. 45, 463 S.E.2d 912 (1995).
261. Id. at 45, 463 S.E.2d at 913. The Property was actually divided into three
tracts-20.475 acres south of a power line right-of-way, 3.668 acres within the right-of-way,

and 8.134 acres north of the right-of-way. The Condemned Tract was taken from the
8.134-acre tract and fronted on a county road and Georgia Highway 301. Id.
262. Id. at 45-46, 463 S.E.2d at 914.
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The condemnee also presented an appraiser's testimony that the
Property had a value of $6.2 million and that the Condemned Tract had
a total value of $132,930 ($45,000 per acre). 26 3 The DOT's appraiser
testified that the Property was worth $5.3 million and that the
Condemned Tract had a value of $103,400 ($35,000 per acre). Additionally, the condemnee presented testimony relating to consequential
damages to the remainder of the Property. That evidence was as
follows: (1) At the time of the taking, the condemnee's business was
already operating at twenty to twenty-five percent over capacity; (2) The
condemnee's business must continue to expand or close; (3) The taking
of the Condemned Tract left an irregular-shaped tract of land that
significantly affected the condemnee's ability to expand its facilities; and
(4) After the taking of the Condemned Tract, the Property was no longer
best suited for use as a wholesale grocery distributorship. Instead, the
highest and best use was as a general warehouse facility.2"' Based on
that evidence, the condemnee's appraiser testified that the condemnee
suffered consequential damages of $4,593,256 to the remainder of the
Property."' The condemnee also presented testimony that it paid
$200,000 to acquire an adjoining tract containing eight acres to
accommodate its planned expansion. The only damages the condemnee
requested was for the taking and for the purchase price of the adjoining
tract.2' The jury awarded the condemnee $185,000, and the DOT
appealed.2 7
On appeal, the DOT made two basic arguments. First, the DOT
contended that the trial court erred in allowing the evidence of the cost
the condemnee incurred in purchasing the adjoining tract.2
In

263. Id. The condemnee also presented the testimony of its chairman that the
Condemned tract had a value of $180,000. The Court's opinion indicated that the
condemnee's chairman testified as an expert. Id. at 46, 463 S.E.2d at 914.
264. Id. The configuration of the Property after the taking meant that the condemnee
would be able to build only a 73,000-square-foot warehouse rather than a warehouse
having 225,000 square feet. Id.
265. Id. The DOT's appraiser also testified that the highest and best use for the
Property was as a wholesale grocery distribution facility. The DOT's appraiser admitted
that use as a general warehouse would result in two million dollars consequential damages
to the remainder of the Property. Id.
266. Id. Apparently, the condemnee recognized that it would have some difficulty
recovering both the diminution in value of the remainder of the Property (consequential
damages) and the cost to purchase the adjoining tract (cost to cure). Those damages
arguably are duplicative and cannot both be recovered. See Davis v. Davidson, 175 Ga.
App. 451, 333 S.E.2d 648 (1985) (double recovery for same injury is not permissible).
267. 219 Ga. App. at 46, 463 S.E.2d at 914.
268. Id. at 47-50, 463 S.E.2d at 914. In the trial court, the DOT made a motion for
directed verdict on the issues of consequential damages and cost to cure. That motion was
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considering that argument, the court first set forth the proper method
for establishing consequential damages. The court stated that the
amount of consequential damages is the reduction, if any, in the market
value of the remaining property "in its circumstance just prior to the
time of the taking compared with its market value in its new circumstance just after the time of the taking." 9 Furthermore, the court
stated that the cost to cure is admissible in partial taking cases as a
factor in determining consequential damages.27 The court concluded,
therefore, that evidence relating to the cost to purchase the adjoining
tract in order to prevent the consequential damage to the remainder of
the Property (that otherwise would have resulted from the change in the
" '
highest and best use) was admissible.27
Second, the DOT argued that the holdings in Colonial Pipeline Co. v.
Williams272 and Department of Transportation v. Benton273 prevented
the condemnee's introduction of evidence regarding planned expansion
onto the Condemned Tract because only present uses of condemned
property are relevant to the value of the land taken. 4 The court also
rejected that argument.275 The court noted that, unlike this case, the
cases relied upon by the DOT did "not involve condeniees who claim
that their land could not be purchased for the same purpose for which
it is being used presently."27 ' Therefore, the court concluded that "the
jury in this case was certainly allowed to consider evidence of the fact
that the market value as of the date of taking was affected because the
property was no longer suitable for its present use." 77
VII.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The single significant legislative development in Georgia real property
law during the survey period relates to the escheat of an intestate

denied. Therefore, the appellate court considered whether there was any evidence to
support the verdict. Id. at 48, 463 S.E.2d at 915.
269. Id. at 47,463 S.E.2d at 915 (quoting Department of Transp. v. Metts, 208 Ga.App.
401, 403, 430 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1993)).
270, Id.
271, Id., 463 S.E.2d at 914. The court relied on Department of Transp. v. Old Natl
Inn, 179 Ga. App. 158, 345 S.E.2d 853 (1986) (holding that the availability of adjacent land
to replace the land taken was relevant in determining the amount of consequential
damages to the remainder).
272. 206 Ga. App. 303, 425 S.E.2d 380 (1992).
273. 214 Ga. App. 221, 447 S.E.2d 159 (1994).
274. 219 Ga. App. at 48, 463 S.E.2d at 915.

275. Id.
276. Id.
277, Id. at 48, 463 S.E.2d at 915-16.
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decedent's property to the state. Escheat is the transfer of property from
the estate of an intestate decedent to the state of Georgia based on an
absence of other legal heirs.27
Currently, the provisions relating to
the escheat of property are codified in O.C.G.A. Title 44, Chapter 5,
Article 8.279 However, House Bill No. 1030, which provided a complete
revision of Chapters 1-11 of Title 55 (Wills, Estates, and Trusts),
repealed and recodified the escheat statute.2 '
The statute relating to escheat of property remains essentially the
same under the newly enacted statute. Under both the old and new
statute, if no person claims to be an heir of an intestate decedent within
a stated period of time, the administrator of the estate is required to
notify the probate court of the absence of heirs.28" Once that notification takes place, notice of the impending escheat of the property must be
given by publication. 8 2 If no heirs appear following the publication,
the property is paid over or distributed to the board of education in the
county where the estate is being administered. 2a
However, there are differences between the old and new statute.
First, the time frame established for the escheat of property is shorter
under the new statute-four years as opposed to five. 2 4 Second, the
new statute eliminates the possibility that, after escheat occurs, an heir
could appear and reclaim the property from the county school board. 2
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Several cases decided during the survey period create questions
concerning the way that real property law will develop in the future. Of
particular interest is the issue concerning the measure of damages in
condemnation cases and the application of the "undivided fee rule." The
authors expect that the owners of property being condemned by public

278. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-190 (1991).

279. See id. §§ 44-5-190 to -199,
280. 1996 Ga. Laws 504, § 9 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 53-2-50 to -51 (Supp. 1996)). The
changes effected by the repeal and recodification of the escheat statute will take effect as
ofJanuary 1, 1998. The estates of all intestate decedents until that date shall be governed

under the old law, Id.
281. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-191 (existing statute); Id. § 55-2-51 (new statute).

282, Id. § 44-5-91. See also id.§ 53-11-4 (Supp. 1996) (describing the method of
publication).

283. rd. § "-5-192.
284, Id. § 44-5-191(a); Id. § 55-2-51(a).
285. Compare id. § 44-5-194 (allowing three years from the school board's receipt of
escheated property for heir to reclaim), with id. § 52-2-51 (stating that escheat proceedings
are conclusive against heirs without provision for reclaiming property).
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entities will devise some creative arguments in order to show the unique
value of their properties and the various interests in them in order to
avoid the limitation seemingly imposed on recovery in condemnation
cases by the decision in Fulton County v. Funk.2 6

286. 266 Ga. 64, 463 S.E.2d 883 (1995). See supra part VI.

